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Abstract 
Although retirements are a major source of legislative turnover, research on the topic has been 
limited, especially outside of the US House of Representatives. In this paper, we address this 
shortcoming by examining retirements in two countries with similar electoral systems yet 
different legislative environments and party systems: Canada and the United Kingdom. In 
particular, we extend analysis on the Congress that has consistently shown Republican members 
retire at higher rates than their Democratic counterparts to examine whether this finding is 
generalizable to legislators from other parties of the right and/or favouring devolution in other 
parliamentary settings. In presenting data that support many of these hypotheses, we explore an 
important normative implication: because their partisan predispositions make them less willing 
to serve, politicians from parties favouring limited government and/or devolution may be less 
able to translate their vision of politics into policy because they face systemic problems 
maintaining legislative seats. 
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1Analyses of legislators’ career decisions in the United States Congress have yielded two 
consistent results: voluntary departures (i.e., retirements) exceed non-voluntary ones (i.e., 
electoral defeat) and Republicans retire at higher rates than Democrats. To date, however, the 
generalizability of these findings has not been tested, since most of the research on this topic has 
been limited to the US House of Representatives. Is the US House an outlier in terms of 
legislative turnover? Are House Republicans typical of other conservative legislators in their 
willingness to walk away from legislative careers? In the US, even the Senate (but see Bernstein 
and Wolak, 2002; Masthay and Overby, 2017) and state legislatures have received scant 
analytical attention when it comes to career decisions. While the literature examining the 
determinants of voluntary and involuntary legislative turnover in legislatures outside the US has 
expanded in recent years, the research on partisan differences in legislative retirements has not.  
The lack of attention to this issue belies its importance. Though the comparative literature 
has yet to examine partisan differences in the rates of retirement, the impact such retirement rates 
have on parties’ fortunes has received attention, particularly among party activists (e.g., Wallace, 
2017). The fact that previous research finds evidence of personal incumbency advantages 
benefitting incumbents’ parties (Cain et al., 1987; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Kendall and 
Rekkas, 2012; Hallam Smith, 2013; Redmond and Regan, 2015), and given that across a variety 
of systems roughly two thirds of incumbent legislators are routinely re-elected (Matland and 
Studlar, 2004; Gouglas et al., 2018), the career decisions of sitting members have significant 
partisan implications for turnover in and composition of legislative chambers outside the US.
2
 If 
                                                          
1
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 Given that the principal role of parliamentary backbenchers is to support their party’s 
leadership through their party loyalty on most votes, experience in office may not be as 
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retirement decisions disproportionately and consistently affect some parties more than others, 
this could have significant consequences for which parties are able to control chambers, form 
governments, and create policy.  
In this paper, we begin to address this lacuna. Guided by work on the US House of 
Representatives, we analyse career decisions in the lower chambers of two parliaments with 
similar electoral systems but different party systems: the Houses of Commons in Canada (1993-
2015) and the United Kingdom (1979-2017). The findings provide insights into whether the 
patterns observed in the US House of Representatives might be generalizable across countries, 
institutions, and political systems. Similar to Republicans in the US, we find that right-of-centre 
MPs are more likely to retire in a given term than those on the left, that MPs belonging to parties 
viewed as being ‘the natural party of government’ are less likely to retire than MPs from other 
parties, and that MPs from parties favouring devolution are more likely to leave for other offices 
than MPs from other parties. These results have an important normative implication: because 
their MPs’ personal preferences make them less willing to stay in office, parties favouring 
limited government and/or devolution may face greater difficulty holding onto the seats 
necessary to form governments and enact their preferred policies. 
 
Legislative Retirements: The View from the US House of Representatives 
In his classic study of political careers, Schlesinger (1966) developed a threefold 
categorization for political ambition: ‘static’ ambition where politicians seek to make a long 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
important for parliamentary backbenchers as it is for members of Congress, who become more 
engaged, specialised, and efficient with seniority (see Hibbing, 1991).  However, it seems 
reasonable to expect that even in parliamentary settings retirements come with internal costs (in 
terms of expertise, familiarity with policies and personnel, and administrative efficiency) as well 
as electoral costs resulting from the loss of incumbency advantage. 
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political career in a particular office; ‘discrete’ ambition wherein politicians desire office for a 
specified time only to then withdraw from public life; and ‘progressive’ ambition where 
politicians aspire to other offices they hold in higher regard. After accounting for legislative 
turnover due to involuntary departures (e.g., electoral defeat, though also including the relatively 
rare cases of expulsion and death in office), the differences between those with static ambition 
and those with either discrete or progressive ambition relate to differences in voluntary 
departures. Accordingly, a large body of research on the US House of Representatives has sought 
to understand and explain members’ voluntary departures from office.  
In the US, where incumbent re-election rates often exceed 90 percent, voluntary 
retirements have become the principal source of turnover in Congress. Voluntary retirements 
were a common feature of nineteenth century congresses, with biennial turnover rates frequently 
surpassing 40 percent. This was unsurprising given that service in a ‘pre-institutionalised’ 
Congress offered little political reward to ambitious politicians. By the late 1800s, however, the 
federal government had assumed greater duties and Congress had developed into an 
institutionally more mature body. This dramatically increased the value of House seats and 
incumbency, resulting in a marked reduction in turnover, especially voluntary retirements. By 
the mid-1950s, the House had become the abode of long-serving career politicians (Bullock, 
1972), and scholars began to assume that incumbents’ political ambitions were driven principally 
if not solely by the desire for re-election (Mayhew, 1974).  
Even as this new perspective was coalescing into conventional wisdom, the reality on the 
ground was shifting, with the 1970s experiencing an unanticipated surge in voluntary departures 
from the House, even as re-election rates for incumbents remained high. Cooper and West (1981) 
pointed to increasingly lengthy sessions, increasingly complex policy issues, increasingly diverse 
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constituency demands, and increasingly wearisome fund-raising requirements, concluding ‘the 
job is not fun anymore’. Hibbing (1982) indicted institutional and partisan changes in the House, 
particularly the move away from seniority norms, which had increased the value of tenure by 
guaranteeing committee leadership roles to long-serving members of the majority party. Other 
scholars concentrated on the calculations of individual members of Congress (MCs). Jacobson 
and Kernell (1983) argued that retirement decisions resulted from personal assessments of the 
estimated costs and benefits of seeking re-election, especially when weighted by the national 
political forces at play in particular election cycles. Kiewiet and Zeng’s (1993) expected utility 
model, derived from labour economics, found that – unexpectedly – age was not a significant 
predictor of congressional retirements, but found support for Hibbing’s institutional reform 
theory. Similarly, Hall and van Houweling (1995) found that members’ individual fiscal 
circumstances and their prospects for further advancement in the chamber were the principal 
influences on retirement decisions. Switching attention back to political factors, Moore and 
Hibbing (1998) found older members, those who were electorally vulnerable, those less senior 
(in comparison to their age), and members at ideological odds with their parties more likely to 
retire over the 1960-1996 period. 
Shifting from causes to their consequences, Gilmour and Rothstein (1993, 1996) showed 
that retirement decisions have important implications for partisan control of the House of 
Representatives. Focusing on the unattractiveness of long-term minority status and analysing the 
period from 1954 to 1990,
3
 they found that voluntary departures ‘cost the Republicans anywhere 
from 5 to 15 seats in the House’, fully 20 percent of their deficit relative to the Democrats (1993, 
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 For an overview of the psychology literature on this point, see Humphrey et al. (2007) whose 
meta-analysis confirms that such features as autonomy, authority, and significance – all of which 
are enhanced in a cabinet position – are associated with overall job satisfaction.  
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p. 358). Ang and Overby (2008) extended the time series forward and capitalised on the natural 
experiment offered by Republican control of the House between 1994 and 2006. Their finding 
that, even when in the majority, House Republicans retired at higher rates than Democrats led 
them to reject Gilmour and Rothstein’s minority party hypothesis. 
Instead of members’ dissatisfaction with minority-party status, differences in retirement 
rates between parties may reflect underlying differences in politicians’ orientations toward 
government. Three factors – ideology, political opportunities, and private sector opportunities – 
have been examined as possible explanations of the partisan differences in retirement rates. 
Using data on House career decisions between the 97
th
 and 108
th
 Congresses, (1997-2004), 
Murakami (2009) found that conservatism was the primary motivator among House members 
leaving public office, while both ideology and political opportunities (specifically plausible paths 
to Senate and gubernatorial seats) motivated those leaving the House for other offices; private 
sector opportunities (as measured by previous career experiences) had no significant effect on 
retirements. In addition to providing a lucid argument for why conservatively inclined 
politicians, who are generally disinclined to hold government office, might prefer governorships 
or Senate seats to secure spots in the House (e.g., the veto pen held by governors and the 
filibuster threat wielded by senators are more useful for shortening than expanding government’s 
reach), Murakami also shows that ideology matters within parties as well as between parties, 
with relatively conservative members on both sides of the aisle more likely to leave the House 
voluntarily. 
 
Retirement in Comparative Perspective 
As noted above, outside of the US House of Representatives few studies have examined 
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legislative retirements to determine whether there is a partisan dimension to such career 
decisions. In a study of retirements from the contemporary Senate (1974-2014), Masthay and 
Overby (2017) find that – as in the House – retirements have far outstripped electoral defeats as a 
source of legislative turnover, with more than 1.75 retirements for each electoral defeat in the 
period. However, as Murakami (2009) speculated, unlike in the House there is no partisan 
differential in retirement rates between Democrats and Republicans. Though less attention has 
been given to the study of retirements in legislatures outside the US Congress, a growing body of 
research has emerged in recent years, finding patterns in legislative turnover that are similar to 
those observed in the US: for instance, as in the US, electoral defeats in other legislatures are far 
less common than other forms of turnover (Gouglas and Maddens, 2019).  
While these works have not explicitly examined partisan differences in retirements, the 
findings in much of this research suggest partisan differences in retirements similar to those seen 
in the US are likely to be found. For one, some research has found that Members of Parliament 
(MPs) belonging to opposition parties (particularly MPs from the smallest parties) are more 
likely to retire than governing-party MPs (e.g., Kerby and Blidook, 2011). Because the 
government/opposition dynamic is more important in many legislatures outside the US, this 
suggests the possibility of partisan differences in retirement rates due to differences between 
government and opposition MPs.  
Other research has examined differences in retirement due to ambitions for holding other 
offices (Stolz, 2003; Borchert, 2011; Borchert and Stolz, 2011). While ‘progressive ambition’ in 
the US context has usually implied running for national-level offices (except in the cases where 
MCs run for a state governorship), the devolution of authority to lower levels of government in 
other countries has opened opportunities for legislators preferring local to national policymaking 
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to retire from national parliaments in pursuit of electoral ambitions in these ‘lower-level’ 
legislatures (Stolz, 2011; Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put, 2013; Dodeigne, 2014, 2018), with 
particular turnover in countries where legislative authority in devolved governments is greatest 
(Gouglas et al., 2018). Similar to Republican MCs preferring that decisions be made by state 
governments retiring from federal office more often than federally-oriented MCs, this suggests 
that MPs from parties preferring the devolution of powers to lower levels of government may 
retire in pursuit of these offices at higher rates than MPs from other parties. While we certainly 
do not mean to exaggerate the similarities between American Republicans and regional parties in 
the UK and Canada – indeed, the regional parties we consider here, the Bloc Québécois and 
SNP, are both in the progressive, social democratic tradition – it seems intuitive that 
representatives who prefer that power be exercised somewhere other than Washington, London, 
or Ottawa should, ceteris paribus, be less interested in long-term careers in those cities. This may 
be particularly the case for SNP MPs in the wake of devolution, which created a new venue at 
their preferred level of government in which they could participate, leading many to leave 
Westminster (Borchert, 2011; Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put, 2013).  
While Murakami (2009) did not find evidence of employment prospects influencing 
retirement from Congress, we might expect partisan differences in retirement rates in other 
countries due to differences in terms of MPs’ employment prospects after leaving office. In the 
UK, previous research shows that Conservative MPs realised significant financial advantages 
after leaving office, being significantly more likely to work as directors of publicly traded firms 
and other high-paying positions, and accruing significantly more wealth, than Labour MPs 
(Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009). Moreover, because MPs from right-of-centre parties have – 
until recently (e.g., Evans and Tilley, 2017) – been more likely than left-of-centre MPs enter 
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Parliament from middle-class occupations (business, law, etc.) that set up lucrative employment 
prospects following their retirement from office and/or lure right-of-centre MPs to return to the 
private sector, we might expect significant partisan differences in discrete career ambitions, with 
MPs from rightist parties more likely to retire to return to their former careers than leftist MPs.  
Finally, we might also expect partisan differences in retirement due to ideological 
differences among the parties’ MPs. Like their Republican counterparts, MPs from right-of-
centre parties may be significantly more likely to hold discrete career ambitions, and thus to 
retire from politics altogether at each election, than other parties’ MPs due to their ideological 
dispositions. We do not want to overdraw the similarities between the Republicans in the US and 
right-of-centre parties elsewhere. Clearly, there are differences, with British and Canadian 
Conservatives being less far to the right than Republicans on a host of issues from morality 
matters to environmentalism (see Volkens et al., 2016). But there are some notable similarities, 
especially regarding the proper role of government (smaller) and its place in society (more 
limited): a look at the British Conservative Party’s recent manifestos demonstrates their 
longstanding commitments to capitalism and free markets, reduced regulation, low taxes and free 
trade, reforming welfare to move more people into work, and a strong national defence. 
Similarly, the Conservative Party of Canada’s May 2016 ‘Policy Declaration’ endorses such 
priorities as a simplified tax code, balanced budgets, and reduced taxes on businesses and capital 
gains. Its ‘belief that a responsible government must be fiscally prudent and should be limited to 
those responsibilities which cannot be discharged reasonably by the individual or others’ would 
certainly be embraced by most Republicans (Conservative Party of Canada, 2016).   
While the rightist ideological orientations of conservative parties’ MPs might make many 
of these parties’ MPs more likely to retire than others, a partisan disposition particular to the UK 
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Conservatives might make these MPs less likely – net of other factors – to retire from office than 
conservative politicians in the US and Canada. For one, British Conservatives have long styled 
themselves as ‘the natural party of government’ – in ways akin to the parties of government in 
the US (the Democrats) and Canada (the Liberals).
4
 Perhaps more important is the fact that while 
the largest left-of-centre parties in the US and Canada have been ideologically left-liberal, the 
British Conservatives’ main opponent is the social-democratic Labour Party. While the right in 
the US and Canada de-emphasises central authority, Conservatives in Britain have combined 
‘a traditional liberal defence of the free economy with a traditional conservative defence of 
state authority’ (Gamble, 1994, pp.35-36), willing to use the state to undo what they perceive 
as the damage wrought by social democracy and to restore the British values that supported a 
free market in earlier days (p.43). As a result, British Conservatives may be more willing to 
sit in government to preserve state authority against the left (Gamble, 1994, pp.65-68). The 
tension between their ideological orientations and partisan desire to remain in office may well 
muddle any effect of party on British Conservative MPs’ career choices.  
 
Examining Retirement in Canada and the United Kingdom 
To explore whether there may be partisan differences in the retirement rates of legislators 
in other countries, we examine individual decisions to retire in Canada (between the years 1993 
and 2015) and the UK (between the years 1979 and 2017). Except for data taken from Norton 
(1999) for the period from 1979-1997 in the UK, data were collected by the authors. Studying 
these two countries allows us to examine legislatures with similar electoral systems (Canada and 
the UK use single-member plurality to elect MPs) but with different party systems. Because we 
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 For the US, see Ehrenhalt (1992). For Canada, see Carty (2015). 
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have variation in the number and types of parties elected to the parliaments of each country, we 
can explore what sorts of factors might explain any partisan differences in retirement rates across 
these countries by exploiting the variation in the parties. Thus, we have control over the general 
contexts in which elections are conducted, which permits comparison with the US.  
The dependent variable measures two types of voluntary departure. After examining all 
retiring MPs, we coded those MPs who voluntarily stood down during or at the end of a 
parliamentary term and did not seek other office as one, while those who stood down to pursue 
careers in other offices were coded as two.  MPs running (successfully or not
5
) for re-election are 
coded zero.
6
  
While most retirements are likely to be retirements from politics reflecting discrete 
ambitions, other MPs in these two countries may choose to move from national-level politics to 
the office at other levels of government. For a variety of reasons, however, such moves are rare. 
Docherty (2011) argues that the contemporary Canadian political career structure is characterised 
by ‘free agency’ and the corresponding lack of a single political career pattern. Canada 
historically had low levels of permeability between the different levels of government (Barrie 
and Gibbins, 1989). The national and regional parties are and have been distinct political entities, 
with different parties operating at the national and provincial levels, resulting in the development 
of alternative career patterns with politicians focused on one level of government or the other, 
with little movement between the two (Barrie and Gibbins, 1989; Detterbeck, 2011; Docherty, 
2011; Pow, 2018). The UK has also developed distinct career paths for regional and national 
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 To determine whether the results are affected by including defeated MPs alongside those MPs 
successfully winning re-election in the baseline, we also estimated models excluding defeated 
MPs (see the supplementary file).  
6
 We exclude those who died in office during the parliamentary term in which they passed away.  
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politicians following devolution. While there was considerable movement of MPs from 
Westminster to the inaugural Scottish Parliament in 1999, the lower levels of office switching in 
subsequent elections indicate that a pattern of alternative career paths has emerged (Stolz, 2011). 
At least prior to the UK’s stated intention to leave the European Union, progressive ambition 
may also take the form of MPs seeking election to the supranational European Parliament – 
though there is little evidence to suggest that many MPs used their national legislatures as a 
springboard for a European political career (Stolz, 2003).
7
  
Additionally, some MPs leave the lower house for careers in the upper chamber. The 
upper chambers of both countries are constitutionally subordinate to the lower chamber, with 
members of the upper chamber appointed (bar 92 hereditary peers in the UK since the House of 
Lords Act 1999) rather than elected. While some MPs do actively seek appointment to these 
upper chambers, the fact the House of Lords and the Canadian Senate cannot compare with the 
US Senate in terms of resources, power, or prestige means this number is low. While the 
numbers leaving the House of Commons for all other political offices are lower than those 
leaving politics altogether,
8
 separating the two types of retirement decisions ensures that we do 
not ignore differences in the effects of different variables on MPs’ decisions.  
Our primary variables of interest are variables measuring the party affiliation of 
members. Prior to 2003, the right in Canada was divided between the Progressive Conservatives 
and the Reform Party (going by the name of the Canadian Alliance from 2000-2003) from 1987 
until the merger that produced the present Conservative Party in 2003. To determine whether the 
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 In addition to the European Parliament, MPs may also have sought appointment to the even 
more important (yet unelected) role of Commissioner.  
8
 Retiring MPs and MPs pursuing another office constitute 12.37 and 2.05 percent, respectively, 
in Canada and 10.05 and 3.89 percent of the sample, respectively, in the UK.  
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less conservative Progressive Conservative MPs were less likely to retire than Reform MPs, we 
include separate variables for Progressive Conservative and Reform/Conservative MPs. We also 
include variables measuring those belonging to the anti-federalist/pro-sovereignty Bloc 
Québécois (who, by dint of these orientations, should be more likely to quit Parliament in favour 
of elected office in Québec than MPs belonging to other parties) and the left-of-centre New 
Democratic Party (NDP). After excluding the handful of MPs elected as independents, this 
leaves MPs from the Liberal Party (viewed by many as the party of government given their long 
stays in office during the twentieth century and the presence of many Liberal-sympathisers in the 
bureaucracy) as the baseline.  
In the UK, we include a dummy variable measuring those belonging to the Conservative 
Party. We also include a variable measuring MPs belonging to the Liberal Democrats,
9
 as well as 
a variable for the Scottish National Party (SNP), as SNP MPs may – similar to Bloc Québécois’ 
MPs – prefer to influence policy at Holyrood, and thus depart Westminster earlier than MPs 
belonging to other parties. We omit MPs representing from Northern Ireland, as well as MPs 
representing the Welsh nationalist Plaid Cymru, due to the small number of MPs for these 
parties. After the handful of MPs elected as independents are also excluded, this leaves the 
Labour Party (the major party of the centre-left, which favours greater government involvement 
in economic and other matters of daily life) as the baseline.   
Several variables allow us to examine other factors that might produce partisan 
differences in retirement. We include two variables that might lead opposition parties’ MPs to 
retire at higher rates than government MPs. One variable measures whether MPs were members 
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 The results of models treating Liberals as distinct from the Social Democrats (who cooperated 
in Parliament and elections from 1981 until 1988 when the two parties formally merged) produce 
similar results to those seen below.  
13 
 
of the cabinet during the parliamentary term. Because being a member of the cabinet means real 
authority, MPs holding a cabinet post are less likely to retire than MPs not in government. 
Because being in government means better access to those in power and the spoils that come 
with holding office, a second variable tests whether MPs belonging to the governing party 
(coded one) may be more willing to stay in office than opposition-party MPs (coded zero).   
We also test the possibility that future employment prospects influence retirement 
decisions. To account for such differences in MPs’ post-parliamentary career prospects, we 
include three variables measuring MPs’ employment backgrounds prior to entering Parliament: 
business, law, and journalism. Each variable is coded one if MP was employed in the listed 
occupation prior to entering Parliament (and zero otherwise) using information from MPs’ 
websites, biographies in the press, and (where applicable) funeral notices. These variables allow 
us to test whether MPs employed in these fields prior to entering Parliament are more likely 
retire from politics to return to their (more lucrative and/or personally rewarding) former 
occupations than MPs from other backgrounds; because there may be partisan differences in the 
backgrounds of MPs formerly employed in these fields, controlling for these variables may help 
to account for any partisan differences in retirements.  
We also examine the impact of several additional variables to control for the other 
prominent factors previous research has shown to influence MPs’ retirement decisions. Because 
MPs are more likely to retire with age, we include MPs’ (logged) age at the end of each term. 
Because MPs are more likely to retire the longer they sit in office, we also include a variable 
measuring the (logged) total number of years served at the start of each term. 
We also include two variables to measure the political climate in which MPs find 
themselves – both personally and in terms of their parties. The first variable measures the size of 
14 
 
MPs’ mandates in the previous election: MPs with smaller vote percentages are less secure in 
their positions than MPs who won their seats with larger vote shares, and thus MPs with higher 
vote shares may be less likely to retire than MPs with lower vote shares. A second variable 
measures the political climate facing MPs’ parties. When a party stands to win more seats in an 
election, the party’s MPs will be less likely to retire, as it means they are more likely to be 
secure; when a party’s fortunes are set to worsen, MPs may retire earlier than they otherwise 
would have. To capture this dynamic, we include a variable measuring the percentage change in 
seats for MPs’ respective parties at each election.10  
Additionally, because MPs may be more likely to retire once they have sat in office long 
enough to secure the potential retirement benefits offered to them (Kerby and Blidook, 2011), we 
also include variables designed to measure the effects of such benefits. In Canada, we include 
two dummy variables: one variable for when MPs first become eligible for retirement benefits 
and one for when they have maxed out their pensions. Because so many British MPs in our data 
set have sat in Parliament long enough to acquire the full benefits of office (which accrue after 
only five years of service), we include only a dummy variable measuring those who have not yet 
become eligible versus those who are eligible. Because the costs of office and contesting 
elections can be particularly demanding on female MPs (e.g., Lovenduski and Norris, 1996; 
Dolan, 2008; Thomas and Bittner, 2017), and because female MPs indicate they are more likely 
than male counterparts to be pushed out of office by party leaders (Vanlangenakker, Wauters, 
                                                          
10
 While the decision to retire occurs before the election is decided, MPs may be able to predict 
when their parties are likely to lose significant seat shares based on the feedback they receive 
from constituents (during constituency surgeries, in correspondences with constituents, etc.): 
consistently negative interactions in the run-up to elections would provide evidence that they and 
their party face difficult re-election prospects, which would lead some MPs to retire rather than 
face defeat. Additionally, there is some evidence they may be able to anticipate poor outcomes 
for their party based on pre-election opinion polling (see the supplementary file).  
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and Madden, 2013), we include a variable coded one for female MPs and zero otherwise. To 
account for any period-specific effects that are not accounted for by variables above, we include 
parliamentary-term fixed effects.  
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the regression models estimating retirements 
in Canada, while Table 2 presents results from the UK. To estimate these models, we use 
multinomial logistic regression with standard errors clustered by MP.
11
 Several factors 
potentially affecting decisions to retire – e.g. age, tenure in office, political opportunities, 
political climate, and retirement benefits – reach statistical significance. However, the results 
also show that even after controlling for these factors, several partisan differences in retirement 
rates persist.   
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Beginning with the case of Canada, the results show that after controlling for other 
factors, Reform (and later, Conservative) MPs were significantly more likely to retire than MPs 
from other parties. Holding all other variables at their median values, Reform/Conservative MPs 
are 5.78 percentage points more likely to retire from politics relative to the baseline. The same is 
not true of Reform/Conservative decisions to seek lower-level offices, as the coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. These findings make sense given sceptical outlook on 
government involvement that has characterised the Reform and Conservative parties, which 
mirrors (even if it does not equal) the attitudes of many Republican MCs. Further evidence of 
this conclusion can be seen in the fact that MPs from the less conservative Progressive 
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 We use multinomial logistic regression (rather than survival models) because retirements, like 
in the US Congress, cluster at the end of each term after the general election has been called.  
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Conservative Party are not significantly more likely to retire from politics than Liberal MPs.  
The results from the Bloc Québécois variable suggest that MPs preferring government 
policy to be controlled by lower levels of government (or by a fully independent Québec) find 
the affairs of federal government less rewarding than others, and therefore retire from federal 
politics to run for lower-level offices at higher rates than Liberal MPs.
12
 Consistent with this 
explanation, the coefficients for Bloc Québécois MPs are positive and statistically significant 
predictors of running for lower-level office. Relative to the Liberal MPs and holding all other 
variables at their median values, Bloc Québécois MPs are 2.25 percentage points more likely to 
retire to run for lower-level office. Like Republican MCs who view federal government action as 
less legitimate than state government action, the fact that many Bloc Québécois MPs prefer 
government action to be taken at the provincial level (or, as the most ardent sovereigntists would 
prefer to say, the national level) would certainly explain this finding. While some Conservative 
MPs might share this preference for provincial powers as well, the fact that we observe such a 
finding among Bloc Québécois MPs provides the strongest evidence that such predispositions are 
at work leading MPs of this persuasion to retire earlier than MPs from other parties.  
Turning to the results among British MPs, we note no significant association between 
Conservative MPs and retirement. This finding is interesting because, as noted above, many 
Conservative MPs are likely torn between their ideological predispositions and their partisan 
motivation to hold office to keep Labour out. Our data, indicating Conservatives are no more 
likely to retire than Labour MPs, suggest that these two sets of preferences largely cancel out.  
While retirement rates do not differ between Conservative and Labour MPs, we observe 
that SNP MPs are particularly likely to retire to seek other political offices (though not to leave 
                                                          
12
 Of the 46 Bloc Québécois MPs who retired during this period, 15 (33 percent) left to 
participate in politics in Québec.   
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politics altogether): SNP MPs are 24.24 percentage points more likely to retire from Westminster 
in favour of Holyrood than Labour MPs. While Labour MPs in England (outside London) have 
not had as many alternative career paths,
13
 the fact SNP MPs are more likely to leave 
Westminster in pursuit of other offices suggests that, similar to Bloc Québécois MPs, these MPs 
find politics in Westminster less rewarding due to their preference for devolved – or independent 
– government. These findings reinforce the conclusion drawn above with regard to the Bloc 
Québécois and suggest that MPs from parties favouring devolution are more likely to retire to 
lower levels of government than those favouring more unitary government action. This 
conclusion, in turn, suggests that at least part of the reason Republican MCs retire at higher rates 
than Democrats in the US is due to the preferences of the former for devolution of federal power 
to the states.  
It is also worth noting that, despite their third-party status and lack of access to power 
throughout most of this period, the likelihood of retirement among NDP MPs is not significantly 
distinct from the baseline. The fact NDP MPs do not depart significantly earlier than Liberal 
MPs is in line with the NDP’s even greater preference for government intervention in the 
economy and society.
14
 Liberal Democrat MPs are 5.61 percentage points less likely than Labour 
                                                          
13
 While other parties’ MPs have sought several different offices (in Europe, at the local level, 
and in the House of Lords), analysis of the retirement decisions of SNP MPs shows that nearly 
everyone sought election to Holyrood. Although the bulk of these occurred before the first 
election to the Scottish Parliament, the fact remains that SNP MPs are significantly more likely 
to leave Westminster even after controlling for the fact that all MPs were significantly more 
likely to leave Westminster for other offices between 1997 and 2001 (i.e., with the fixed effect 
for this parliamentary term).  
14
 The NDP’s most recent policy book (https://xfer.ndp.ca/2018/Documents/2018-POLICY.pdf) 
includes a strong endorsement of the public sector, including ‘protecting crown corporations 
against privatization …. Improving the public sector’s role as a wealth creator and major 
provider of jobs …. Opposing all forms of privatization and in supporting the delivery of all 
public services by public sector workers’.  
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MPs to retire from politics altogether, and instead are 10.11 percentage points more likely to 
seek other political offices.
15
 These findings – paired with the fact governing-party status has no 
significant effect in either country – support earlier research showing that minority-party status 
per se does not lead to higher retirement rates (Ang and Overby, 2008; Murakami, 2009).  
Finally, it is interesting to note that MPs’ career backgrounds have little effect on their 
probabilities of leaving office. In Britain, the lack of a significant positive relationship between 
Conservative MPs and retirement may be in keeping with recent research noting the rise in well-
educated and career-orientated Labour MPs (e.g., Evans and Tilley, 2017), which may help to 
reduce partisan differences. The higher rates of retirement among Reform/Conservative MPs in 
Canada, however, are clearly not due to better career prospects outside of Parliament.  
 
Robustness Test: Examining the Impact of Ideology 
While the results showing partisan differences in the probabilities of retirement are in 
keeping with the expectations stated above, these models are unable to account for the impact of 
MPs’ personal ideological dispositions (as opposed to the ideological profile of their parties) on 
their likelihood of retirement. To determine the impact of ideology on MPs’ retirement decisions, 
we are able to reanalyse the British models including a survey measure of MP’s ideology.16 
Specifically, we use a measure of left-right ideology taken from three waves of the British 
Representation Study that allow us to examine retirements in advance of the 2001, 2005, and 
                                                          
15
 Liberal Democrat MPs sought a range of different offices, from local councils to Holyrood to 
the House of Lords.  
16
 Unlike congressional studies, we are unable to control for MPs’ left-right positions using 
measures like NOMINATE (see Poole and Rosenthall, 1997) due to the significantly higher 
levels of party discipline and cohesion, which render roll-call votes unrepresentative of MPs’ 
ideological dispositions (e.g. Carrubba et al., 2006). 
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2010 elections (Norris et al., 1997; Norris and Lovenduski, 2001; Lovenduski, Childs, and 
Campbell, 2005).
17
 In these surveys, MPs placed themselves along a left-right scale ranging from 
one (left) to ten (right). To account for the fact that most right-leaning MPs tend to belong to the 
Conservative Party, which leaves few right-leaning MPs in the baseline (and increasing the 
possibility of outlier effects among non-Conservative MPs), we use values of MPs’ left-right 
self-placements. This allows us to test whether the experience of Republican MCs – where those 
placing themselves to the right are more likely to retire than MPs placing themselves to the left – 
can be generalised.  
Including the variable measuring MPs’ left-right self-placements, we re-estimated the 
models of retirement from the British House of Commons, focusing on those who retired from 
politics altogether (and dropping the small number of MPs in the sample who retired to seek 
political office elsewhere). Due to the restriction of the time period, in which Labour is the 
governing party, we drop the variable measuring differences between government and opposition 
MPs, as well as the variable measuring changes in parties’ seat shares. The results using logistic 
regression appear in Table 3.  
Table 3 about here 
                                                          
17
 These surveys were collected from candidates in the run-up to the general elections of 1997, 
2001, and 2005. Though Conservative MPs were somewhat less likely to be included in the 
survey than Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, the samples are quite representative of the 
parties’ seat shares in Parliament. In 1997, Labour won 63 percent of the seats in the Commons 
(65 percent in the sample of MPs), the Conservatives won 25 percent (21 percent of the sample), 
the Liberal Democrats 7 percent (12 percent of the sample), and the SNP 1 percent (1 percent of 
the sample). In 2001: Labour 63 (70 percent of the sample), Conservatives 25 (23 percent of the 
sample), Liberal Democrats 8 (6 percent of the sample), SNP 1 (1 percent of the sample). In 
2005: Labour 55 percent (53 percent of the sample), Conservatives 31 percent (29 percent of the 
sample), Liberal Democrats 10 percent (17 percent of the sample), SNP 1 (0 percent of the 
sample). The MPs included are representative of all other predictors used in Tables 1-3 except 
those with a background in law and with higher vote shares (both are less likely to be included in 
the sample).  
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Table 3 suggests both ideology and career goals impact the likelihood of retirement. Left-
right ideology is positively and significantly associated with retirement. This suggests, as with 
the case of Republican MCs in the US Congress, that right-of-centre politicians – who tend to 
prefer less government intervention in private economic and social affairs – are significantly 
more likely to retire than more leftist MPs. As seen in Figure 1, which plots the predicted 
probability of retirement across the range of left-right ideology (holding all other variables at 
their medians), MPs placing themselves farthest to the left have a 6.83 percent chance of retiring 
in any one term, while MPs placing themselves farthest to the right have a 32.0 percent chance of 
retiring. This 25 percentage-point difference means there is considerably more turnover among 
MPs on the right than on the left. 
Figure 1 about here 
Additionally, the results in Table 3 show that after controlling for MPs’ left-right self-
placements, Conservative MPs become significantly less likely to retire than Labour MPs. In 
keeping with the notion that the party sees incumbency as important to keeping Labour out of 
office (Gamble, 1994, pp.65-68), Conservative MPs are 8.01 percentage points – holding all 
other variables at their median values – less likely to retire than Labour MPs. Similar to the 
Democrats in the US and the Liberals in Canada, the fact Conservative MPs are even less likely 
to retire than Labour MPs (the party in government at the time) is also in keeping with the 
Conservatives’ notion as being the natural party of government (at least after accounting for left-
right ideology).  
 
Discussion 
The results presented above provide several interesting insights regarding the decision to 
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retire from legislatures. For one, the results confirm our initial intuition that partisan differences 
in retirement rates are not confined to the US. There, members of the Republican Party in the 
House of Representatives are more likely to retire from office than Democrats. In this analysis, 
in both Canada and the UK, we observe partisan differences in retirement rates that shed light on 
the findings seen in earlier research.  
Our research design allows us to examine many of the arguments potentially explaining 
these partisan differences in retirement rates. The results presented above provide evidence that 
ideological dispositions are at work cross-nationally, leading members of certain parties to retire 
earlier than MPs from other parties. As with Republican MCs who are generally opposed on 
ideological grounds to government intervention in the economy, similarly predisposed 
Conservative MPs in Canada were significantly more likely to retire than MPs from other 
parties. Although we did not find evidence demonstrating a similar partisan difference between 
Conservative and other MPs in Britain, our results did show that right-of-centre MPs were 
significantly more likely to retire than left-of-centre MPs. Thus, in keeping with the findings 
from the study of American legislatures, right-of-centre legislators are more likely to retire early 
due to their ideological preferences.  
A second explanation for partisan differences in retirement for which we find evidence is 
preference for independence/devolved government. Analogous to Republican preferences for 
government power to be vested in the states (as opposed to the federal government), MPs from 
parties devoted to such causes – the Bloc Québécois in Canada and the SNP in the UK – are 
significantly more likely to retire than MPs from other parties and seek other political offices in 
devolved governments. These results reflect in the other direction as well, suggesting that 
American Republicans, as a party preferring devolved government, are not unique in their 
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aversion to national legislative service.  
A third factor motivating retirements suggested by our analysis regards the impact of 
parties perceived as being ‘the’ party of government. Similar to the Republicans in the US, 
Conservatives in Canada are significantly more likely to retire than the Canadian party most 
clearly identified with government, the Liberals (akin to the Democrats in the US). Providing 
even clearer, more direct evidence in favour of such identities is the experience of the 
Conservatives in the UK: the fact Conservative MPs become less likely to retire than Labour 
MPs after accounting for left-right ideology provides at least moderately suggestive evidence 
that Conservative MPs are less likely to retire due to their perceived responsibility to govern (or 
at least to prevent Labour from governing: Gamble, 1994, pp.65-68). The absence of partisan 
differences in retirement between Conservative and Labour MPs before accounting for left-right 
ideological placements suggests many Conservative MPs are conflicted by their perceived duty 
to govern and their ideological predilection for less government.  
These results carry important normative implications. Political decisions are made by 
those who participate (Dahl, 1961). If one party or another faces systemic difficulties in getting 
its supporters to stand for and hold elective office, that party surrenders a disproportionate share 
of the advantages of incumbency and seniority. Our research suggests that while the situation in 
individual cases varies, right-leaning, sub-nationalist, and other parties less fond of certain 
government activities (or government more generally) are structurally disadvantaged in the 
political realm; and, as Sprague noticed in 1981, even small differences in holding seats can be 
‘consequential’. Given that incumbents can use the resources of the office to improve their 
chances of re-election, lower levels of retention due to higher rates of retirement make the costs 
of holding onto power all the greater for these parties. Moreover, the increased costs of re-
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election for these parties mean it is harder for them to retain the seat shares in their respective 
legislatures needed to pass policies favourable to their voters. Though many right-of-centre 
parties possess structural advantages – like larger resource bases – over left-of-centre parties, the 
need to recruit candidates more frequently makes the cost of retirements more significant for 
parties on the right than parties on the left: while right-leaning parties – as well as nationalist 
parties of the right or left – sceptical of the work of national governments spend more time and 
resources recruiting candidates, left-leaning parties and politicians favourably disposed to the 
national government enjoy incumbency advantages that may give these parties an important 
electoral advantage.  
While this paper has provided support for these arguments, the results presented here 
should not be considered conclusive. Admittedly, we have examined only two countries (and 
even then, only examined parliaments at the national level). More work testing this argument in 
other countries and at different levels of government – especially at lower levels of government 
that might give rise to progressive ambition, and perhaps even at the supra-national level (e.g., 
the European Parliament) – is needed to test the robustness of the tentative conclusions drawn 
here. Research examining the impact of institutional variation – differences in properties of the 
electoral system and differences in the institutional structure regarding backbench participation 
(such as committee structures, free votes, and the ability of backbench MPs to influence the 
agenda) – on partisan differences in retirement rates would be particularly welcome. That being 
said, the results are sufficient to compel us to treat the partisan differences in retirement rates 
seriously and to explore the empirical and normative consequences of these differences in future 
research.   
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Table 1: Predicting Retirement from the Canadian House of Commons 
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Reform/Conservative    0.611 (0.209)*** -0.526 (0.593) 
Progressive Conservative   0.283 (0.557)  1.200 (0.952) 
Bloc Québécois    0.342 (0.298)  1.144 (0.549)** 
New Democratic Party   0.049 (0.311)  -0.245 (0.682) 
Cabinet Member    -0.018 (0.216)  -1.349 (0.671)** 
Governing Party    -0.194 (0.211)  -0.691 (0.681) 
Business Background    -0.115 (0.153)  -0.007 (0.364) 
Law Background    -0.158 (0.197)  -0.263 (0.465) 
Journalism Background   0.268 (0.278)  0.338 (0.602) 
Age      3.962 (0.565)*** -0.998 (0.796) 
Tenure      0.892 (0.251)*** 1.333 (0.584)** 
Vote Percentage    -1.697 (0.723)** 4.848 (1.815)*** 
Seat Change     -1.249 (0.820)  -3.217 (2.039) 
Pension Eligible    0.389 (0.286)  1.435 (0.864)* 
Pension Maxed    0.600 (0.463)  2.043 (1.189)* 
Female     0.042 (0.173)  -0.063 (0.446) 
Constant     -17.031 (2.259)*** -3.922 (3.126) 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       250.78*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.18 
MPs (Total n)       840 (2177) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
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Table 2: Predicting Retirement from the British House of Commons 
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Conservative     0.034 (0.126)  0.174 (0.200) 
Liberal/Liberal Democrat   -0.652 (0.309)** 1.745 (0.296)*** 
Scottish National Party   0.191 (0.622)  3.150 (0.481)*** 
Cabinet Member    -0.542 (0.252)** 0.824 (0.253)*** 
Governing Party    -0.008 (0.137)  0.233 (0.223) 
Business Background    -0.222 (0.139)  -0.486 (0.209)** 
Law Background    -0.104 (0.142)  0.202 (0.207) 
Journalism Background   0.057 (0.178)  -0.561 (0.304)* 
Age      5.474 (0.516)*** 4.269 (0.906)*** 
Tenure      0.475 (0.117)*** 1.998 (0.251)*** 
Vote Percentage    -1.454 (0.704)** -0.262 (1.102) 
Seat Change     -2.004 (0.547)*** 1.053 (0.822) 
Ineligible for Pension    -0.383 (0.320)  1.099 (0.524)* 
Female     -0.096 (0.157)  0.380 (0.263) 
Constant     -24.697 (2.004)*** -26.501 (3.420)*** 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       633.77*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.20 
MPs (Total n)       1950 (5682) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
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Table 3: Using MPs’ Ideology to Predict Retirement from the British House of Commons, 
1997-2010 
 
Variables      Left Politics 
Left-Right Ideology     0.274 (0.122)** 
Conservative      -1.213 (0.613)** 
Liberal/Liberal Democrat    -1.198 (0.787) 
Cabinet Member     0.632 (0.634) 
Business Background     -0.319 (0.427) 
Law Background     -0.292 (0.612) 
Journalism Background    0.680 (0.529) 
Age       8.988 (1.989)*** 
Tenure       0.377 (0.387) 
Vote Percentage     -2.878 (2.497) 
Ineligible for Pension     -0.737 (0.832) 
Female      0.483 (0.396) 
Constant      -38.767 (7.956)*** 
Parliamentary Term Dummies   Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2      53.90*** 
McFadden’s R2      0.26 
MPs (Total n)      452 (590) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.  SNP MPs omitted due to the small number of such MPs.   
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Figure 1: The Predicted Probabilities of Retiring Across the Range of Left-Right Ideology 
 
 
Notes: dots represent the predicted probabilities of retiring while bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Supplemental File for Calling it Quits: Legislative Retirements in Comparative 
Perspective 
 
 
This supplemental file presents parameter estimates from robustness tests of the analyses seen 
in the main file. Specifically, Tables S.1-S.3 below mirror Tables 1-3 in the main text, but 
omit those MPs experiencing ‘involuntary’ exits from Parliament (i.e., it omits MPs during 
the term in which they lost in their re-election bids). The results confirm the substantive 
findings reported in the main text, particularly as it relates to the partisan differences in 
retirement rates.  
 
Table S.4 replaces the variable measuring the changes in parties’ seat shares with a variable 
measuring the anticipated changes in parties’ vote shares.  Using data from Pack (2019), who 
collected polling data measuring voting intentions for each election, we created a variable 
measuring the change in parties’ vote shares that would be predicted at the start of the 
election.  Specifically, we take parties’ vote shares in the previous election and subtract these 
from the parties’ average intended vote share in the year leading up to the date on which 
Parliament was dissolved.  (Data for the SNP were not available.)  The results in Table S.4 
confirm the results in Table 2: although the sign of the coefficient for the effect of 
Conservative MPs on leaving office is reversed, it nonetheless remains statistically 
insignificant – while the variable measuring changes in parties’ anticipated vote shares is 
statistically significant.  Moreover, Liberal/Liberal Democrat MPs remain significantly less 
likely to leave politics than Labour MPs and significantly more likely to leave Westminster 
for another office.  While we lack comparable data for Canada, the data in Table S.4 suggest 
that MPs may retire early when they anticipate that their party is likely to suffer major losses 
in the upcoming election based on pre-election polling.   
 
Tables S.5 and S.6 test the robustness of the findings seen in Tables 1 and 2 further by 
omitting the variable measuring changes in parties’ seat shares.  The results show that the 
findings seen in Tables 1 and 2 are not dependent on the inclusion of the variable measuring 
changes in parties’ seat shares.  Reform/Conservative MPs in Canada are significantly more 
likely to leave politics than Liberal MPs, while there is no significant difference between 
Conservative and Labour MPs in Britain.  Bloc Québécois and SNP MPs remain significantly 
more likely to retire to pursue other political offices, as are Liberal/Liberal Democrat MPs in 
Britain. 
 
  
Reference 
Pack M (2019) Voting intention opinion polls 1943-present: Q1 2019. Accessed at: 
https://www.markpack.org.uk/158256/voting-intention-opinion-polls-1943-present-
q1-2019/.  
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Table S.1: Predicting Retirement from the Canadian House of Commons, Excluding Defeated 
MPs  
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Reform/Conservative    0.471 (0.218)** -0.866 (0.667) 
Progressive Conservative   0.147 (0.576)  1.293 (0.977) 
Bloc Québécois    0.501 (0.312)  1.423 (0.590)** 
New Democratic Party   0.150 (0.312)  -0.228 (0.696) 
Cabinet Member    0.032 (0.218)  -1.317 (0.670)** 
Governing Party    -0.060 (0.220)  -0.466 (0.744) 
Business Background    -0.075 (0.159)  <-0.001 (0.370) 
Law Background    -0.193 (0.212)  -0.248 (0.466) 
Journalism Background   0.372 (0.294)  0.369 (0.575) 
Age      4.072 (0.560)*** -0.787 (0.787) 
Tenure      0.664 (0.257)*** 1.064 (0.610)* 
Vote Percentage    -3.020 (0.764)*** 3.928 (1.849)** 
Seat Change     -0.806 (0.871)  -2.689 (1.676) 
Pension Eligible    0.535 (0.300)* 1.591 (0.889)* 
Pension Maxed    0.823 (0.478)* 2.394 (1.240)* 
Female     -0.018 (0.183)  -0.038 (0.440) 
Constant     -16.668 (2.256)*** -4.185 (3.140) 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       253.68*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.19 
MPs (Total n)       668 (1806) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
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Table S.2: Predicting Retirement from the British House of Commons, Excluding Defeated 
MPs 
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Conservative     0.041 (0.127)  0.160 (0.203) 
Liberal/Liberal Democrat   -0.448 (0.321)  1.785 (0.298)*** 
Scottish National Party   -0.077 (0.737)  3.253 (0.484)*** 
Cabinet Member    -0.583 (0.259)** 0.807 (0.255)*** 
Governing Party    -0.018 (0.138)  0.168 (0.220) 
Business Background    -0.212 (0.142)  -0.434 (0.210)** 
Law Background    -0.076 (0.147)  0.219 (0.210) 
Journalism Background   0.052 (0.184)  -0.580 (0.306)* 
Age      5.616 (0.529)*** 4.268 (0.917)*** 
Tenure      0.428 (0.120)*** 1.964 (0.255)*** 
Vote Percentage    -2.841 (0.752)*** -0.968 (1.127) 
Seat Change     -3.296 (0.550)*** -0.337 (0.839) 
Ineligible for Pension    -0.511 (0.334)  1.058 (0.522)** 
Female     -0.109 (0.161)  0.376 (0.263) 
Constant     -24.280 (2.055)*** -25.857 (3.471)*** 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       645.03*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.22 
MPs (Total n)       1760 (5123) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
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Table S.3: Using MPs’ Ideology to Predict Retirement from the British House of Commons, 
2001-2010 
 
         Excluding  
Variables     All MPs  Defeated MPs 
Left-Right Ideology    0.274 (0.122)** 0.276 (0.131)** 
Conservative     -1.213 (0.613)** -1.417 (0.656)** 
Liberal/Liberal Democrat   -1.198 (0.787)  -1.402 (0.804)* 
Cabinet Member    0.632 (0.634)  0.656 (0.643) 
Business Background    -0.319 (0.427)  -0.303 (0.438) 
Law Background    -0.292 (0.612)  -0.291 (0.623) 
Journalism Background   0.680 (0.529)  0.637 (0.529) 
Age      8.988 (1.989)*** 8.892 (1.961)*** 
Tenure      0.377 (0.387)  0.400 (0.381) 
Vote Percentage    -2.878 (2.497)  -4.257 (2.681) 
Ineligible for Pension    -0.737 (0.832)  -0.830 (0.843) 
Female     0.483 (0.396)  0.554 (0.386) 
Constant     -38.767 (7.956)*** -37.637 (6.879)*** 
Parliamentary Term Dummies  Yes   Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2     53.90***  52.96*** 
McFadden’s R2     0.26   0.27 
MPs (Total n)     452 (590)  432 (554) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.  SNP MPs omitted due to the small number of such MPs.   
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Table S.4: Predicting Retirement from the British House of Commons, Replacing the 
Variable Measuring Seat Share Changes with a Polling-Based Measure 
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Conservative     -0.132 (0.122)  0.193 (0.216) 
Liberal/Liberal Democrat   -0.901 (0.339)*** 1.814 (0.343)*** 
Cabinet Member    -0.540 (0.253)** 0.817 (0.252)*** 
Governing Party    -0.044 (0.150)  0.201 (0.242) 
Business Background    -0.248 (0.140)* -0.454 (0.213)** 
Law Background    -0.118 (0.143)  0.221 (0.209) 
Journalism Background   0.069 (0.180)  -0.570 (0.315)* 
Age      5.500 (0.521)*** 4.342 (0.929)*** 
Tenure      0.478 (0.118)*** 1.957 (0.253)*** 
Vote Percentage    -1.702 (0.702)** -0.063 (1.124) 
Polling – Previous Vote Share  -2.004 (0.547)*** 1.053 (0.822) 
Ineligible for Pension    -0.492 (0.341)  0.742 (0.604) 
Female     -0.135 (0.158)  0.321 (0.276) 
Constant     -24.660 (2.025)*** -26.710 (3.512)*** 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       599.11*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.20 
MPs (Total n)       1881 (5576) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
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Table S.5: Predicting Retirement from the Canadian House of Commons, Removing the 
Variable Measuring Seat Share Changes 
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Reform/Conservative    0.524 (0.196)*** -0.526 (0.593) 
Progressive Conservative   0.197 (0.558)  1.200 (0.952) 
Bloc Québécois    0.405 (0.296)  1.144 (0.549)** 
New Democratic Party   0.121 (0.306)  -0.245 (0.682) 
Cabinet Member    -0.002 (0.214)  -1.349 (0.671)** 
Governing Party    -0.020 (0.190)  -0.691 (0.681) 
Business Background    -0.116 (0.153)  -0.007 (0.364) 
Law Background    -0.159 (0.196)  -0.263 (0.465) 
Journalism Background   0.269 (0.277)  0.338 (0.602) 
Age      3.972 (0.563)*** -0.998 (0.796) 
Tenure      0.896 (0.250)*** 1.333 (0.584)** 
Vote Percentage    -1.725 (0.724)** 4.848 (1.815)*** 
Pension Eligible    0.373 (0.285)  1.435 (0.864)* 
Pension Maxed    0.568 (0.458)  2.043 (1.189)* 
Female     0.042 (0.173)  -0.063 (0.446) 
Constant     -17.085 (2.256)*** -3.922 (3.126) 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       247.30*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.17 
MPs (Total n)       840 (2177) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
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Table S.6: Predicting Retirement from the British House of Commons, Removing the 
Variable Measuring Seat Share Changes 
 
                 Outcome   
Variables     Left Politics  Other Office 
Conservative     -0.091 (0.122)  0.168 (0.202) 
Liberal/Liberal Democrat   -0.561 (0.309)* 1.669 (0.285)*** 
Scottish National Party   0.268 (0.631)  3.083 (0.478)*** 
Cabinet Member    -0.536 (0.251)** 0.824 (0.253)*** 
Governing Party    0.290 (0.110)*** 0.073 (0.194) 
Business Background    -0.239 (0.140)* -0.486 (0.209)** 
Law Background    -0.123 (0.143)  0.215 (0.208) 
Journalism Background   0.062 (0.179)  -0.572 (0.303)* 
Age      5.482 (0.516)*** 4.209 (0.905)*** 
Tenure      0.514 (0.115)*** 2.007 (0.254)*** 
Vote Percentage    -1.848 (0.695)*** -0.018 (1.097) 
Ineligible for Pension    -0.370 (0.320)  1.132 (0.527)** 
Female     -0.085 (0.156)  0.372 (0.262) 
Constant     -24.671 (2.001)*** -26.296 (3.410)*** 
Parliamentary Term Dummies    Yes 
Likelihood Ratio χ2       605.47*** 
McFadden’s R2       0.20 
MPs (Total n)       1950 (5682) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Coefficients with standard errors 
clustered by MP in parentheses.   
 
 
